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C A U S A T I O N 
ABSTRACT. As cause we often specify an event the occurrence of which first 
guaranteed that of the effect. This notion is explicated in a framework of branching 
worlds in Sections I to V. VI and VII point out its close relations to the concept of an 
agent's bringing about an event. The topic of the last two sections is the distinction 
between causes and necessary circumstances. For this purpose conditionals are 
used, interpreted with respect to branching worlds without a similarity relation between 
them. 
No simple definition of causation can cover the complex use of causal 
terms in everyday discourse. The best we can do is try to disentangle 
the different strands in this usage and define different types of causa-
tion. When I propose yet another definition, radically departing in 
some points from most of the current ones, it should be kept in mind, 
therefore, that there is no claim attached that it captures the 'true' 
concept of causation. My aim is just to explicate one of the notions 
underlying our usage: A cause is an event, which was not sure to have 
occurred and whose occurrence first guaranteed that of the effect. 
This description can also be understood epistemically, but I take it in 
a purely factual sense here. The effect, therefore, is conceived of as a 
necessary consequence of an event which in turn didn't occur neces-
sarily. The concept of necessity employed is not a logical or nomolo-
gical one. Necessary is rather what is the case, no matter what turn 
the future history of the world will take. The frame of my analyses 
are worlds with branching histories. The radical difference from most 
of the current concepts of causation can be seen from the conse-
quence that in deterministic, unbranching worlds there are no causes 
of this type, that effects are not causes and therefore no causal chains 
occur. It will be shown that this concept of causing is closely related 
to that of bringing about by an agent. Hence it can be termed 
"actionistic" — although only in a very wide sense of this word. Its 
closest relative is the type of causation that G. H. von Wright has 
Journal of Philosophical Logic 22: 563-588, 1993. 
© 1993 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 
analysed in (1974). Finally I show how to define truth conditions for 
conditionals in this framework and how to use them to distinguish 
causes from necessary circumstances. 
I. T R E E - U N I V E R S E S 
In what follows I shall not specify a language in which causal sen-
tences can be expressed, but only talk about models for such a lan-
guage. The analyses, therefore, are confined to the objective level. I 
shall also use only very simple models with a discrete time order. 
Many applications demand generalisations, but here I just want to 
present the basic ideas as simply as possible and free from complica-
tions. The model structure employed has — for a richer time order — 
already been defined in (1986), but as this paper is in German, I shall 
give a short sketch of it here again. 
Worlds are conceived of as functions from timepoints into world-
states (WS, for short) so that w(t) is the state of the world w at time 
t. For simplicity's sake it is assumed that all worlds have a beginning 
in time and last equally long. The set T of times, therefore, is the set 
of natural numbers or an initial segment thereof. The worlds of a 
universe are the branches of one or more trees. Hence every WS w(i) 
with the exception of the initial states has exactly one immediate 
predecessor w(t — 1), different from it, and two worlds w and W that 
are in the same state in /, share their history before /. A WS, then, 
cannot be the product of different developments, of different world 
histories. Tree-universes are chosen because we are interested in a 
concept of possibility according to which only what is real or realiz-
able is possible. What is past or present cannot be changed anymore, 
so it is possible only if real. For an epistemic concept of possibility 
tree structures would not be appropriate, as v. Wright remarked, for 
as far as we know the present WS can very well be the product of 
different developments. 
We can also define tree-universes starting with a set / of WS and a 
relation r of immediate succession on /, instead of sets of times and 
worlds. 
Dl: A tree-universe is a pair U = </, r> such that 
(1) / is a set of WS. 
(2) r is a binary relation on / such that for all i, j e I we have 
(a) /0-.= U:-iKi(iJ7)} # A, 
(b) MVjUelo A y r * 0 / ) , 
(c) /r/' A krj ZD i = k, 
(d) for all natural numbers m and « with m < n: 
Vik(isl0 A *Vfc) => Mk(iel0 A => Ky(fcr/)). 
In (a) / 0 is the set of initial states and A the empty set. In (b) r>0 is the 
ancestral of r, i.e. ir*°j holds iff there is a n ^ 0 such that /r"y, where these 
relative powers are defined by ir°j := i = j and u"+lj «= Vkipfk A AT/). 
(b), therefore, implies that every WS in / is an initial state or the 
(immediate or mediate) successor of an initial state. According to (c) 
every WS has only one predecessor, and in view of D3 (d) says that 
all worlds are equally long. From (a) to (c) it follows that for every 
WS i there is exactly one number n for which Vj(j e / 0 A jr*i) holds. 
This number will be designated by z(i). We can then define the sets T 
of time points and W of worlds as follows: 
D2: T-.= {n: Vi(z(i) = «)}. 
Times will be designated by t, t', . . . . 
D3: W:= {weIT: At(w(t)rw(t + 1) A H<0) G /<>)}. 
Worlds, then, are functions from T into /, such that immediately 
succeeding WS are related by r, and w(0) is an initial state. We then 
have z(w(t)) = t. Worlds could also be defined as maximal sets of WS 
on which P ° is a linear ordering. 
II. E V E N T S 
If a language is interpreted on tree-universes sentences will be assigned 
truth values that are dependent on worlds and times, not just on WS. 
The truth value of a sentence about the future, e.g., does not just 
depend on the present state of the world, but on its further develop-
ment. Propositions as intensions of sentences, then, are subsets of 
W x T, i.e. sets of pairs of worlds and times. Instead of "propositions" 
we will talk of states of affairs (SAs, for short). In connexion with 
causal relations we are interested mainly in events. In every world, in 
which it occurs, an event has a well-defined beginning and a well-
defined ending. Every event occurs at most once in every world. Let 
T, T\ . . be time intervals [/,, t2] with tx < t2. Then an event may be 
defined as a set E of segments wz of worlds. wr is the set of all WSs 
H(/) with / e T. If t| is the first and T2 the last point of r and we have 
H'T e E and w'(t2) = W(T2) then w'x is in £ , too. We assume that the 
same event does not start in two worlds at different times as long as 
they coincide. For if they share a common history until the event has 
started in both of them, there is no reason for saying that it starts 
later in one than in the other. We do not assume, however, that if 
vvr e E and there is a / with T, ^ / < T2 and w\t) = w(t), then there 
is an interval T' with x\ = t, such that w'r is in £ , too. If Joe climbs a 
mountain in wz and w' is exactly as w up to /, it does not follow, that 
Joe climbs the mountain in w\ too, for in w' he may get tired and 
return before he gets to the top. We arrive then at the definition: 
D4: An event is a set E of segments of worlds wr such that 
(a) vvr, wt G E 3 T = tr, 
(b) H'R, vv> G E A H'R n HV 7* A T, = x\. 
There is a unique correspondence between eventlike SAs and events. 
If we set, for X <= W x T, 
D5: L(X, w, T) := A /> G = / er) — X holds in w exactly in 
T, we can say 
D6: A SA * is eventlike iff A W(K/«H', / > G J ) D KTL(JT, W, T)) A 
A WW'T{L(X, W\ T) A n\ = vv^  => L(A", w', T)) A A WW'TTXAA", W, T) A 
L(A", w', T') A w r n # A D T, = TJ). 
If X is eventlike {wT: L(X, w, T)} is the corresponding event, and the 
eventlike SA {<H\ />: VT(M\ G E A / G T)} corresponds to the event £ . 
We can specify events "abstractly" by sentences and speak, for 
instance, of the event, that peak K2 is climbed for the first time. We 
can also designate them "concretely" by (perfect) nominalizations like 
"The first climbing of K2". The former event occurs in all worlds in 
which K2 is climbed for the first time - no matter by whom and 
under what circumstances. The latter event, however, is the first 
climbing as it actually occurred. Hence it occurs in another world 
only if it comes to pass there in exactly the same way as in our world. 
"Exactly", of course, is rather strong. Mostly the context specifies — 
more or less clearly — certain aspects under which the event is con-
sidered. The first climbing of K2, under the aspects of type A, then is 
the event that occurs in a world iff K2 there is climbed for the first 
time in a way that under all A-aspects is equal to the way it is actu-
ally climbed in our world. "Concrete" events, however, are also sets 
of world segments corresponding to eventlike SAs. Events are dis-
cussed in more detail in Kutschera (1993). 
III. N E C E S S I T Y 
If only eternal sentences are taken into account, as in most logics, the 
necessity of a proposition depends just on worlds. In our frame the 
notions of analytical and nomological necessity would have to be 
defined by 
U{X) := A wf«w, t} G X) — X is analytically necessary, 
L(w, X) := Aw'(wRw' ZD At ((w\ /> G X)) 
— In w X is nomologically necessary. 
Here wRw' says that in w' the same natural laws hold as in w. We 
can, however, also introduce a timedependent necessity. First we define 
D7: (a) Xt := {w: <w, r> G X} - The SA that X holds in /,» 
(b) Wl {w: w(z(i)) = /} — The set of all the worlds passing 
through WS i. 
We can express a timedependent necessity then by 
D8: N(w9 t, X) := W*il) cz X(. 
The SA X, therefore, is necessary from the standpoint of WS w(t) iff 
X holds in / in all worlds coinciding with w in /. We then have 
D(X) = A w'tN(w\ t, X) and L(w, X) = A w\wRw' ZD A tN(w\ U 
For events £ we get: N(w9 t, E) = W** c {w': FT(H>; e E A te T)}. 
A world is deterministic if it does not contain a branching point. 
Every event occurring in such a world occurs necessarily from the 
beginning and truth coincides with necessity. A universe is deter-
ministic if all its worlds are deterministic. 
IV. C A U S E S 
Causal relations are relations between events. That E is a cause of E' 
is true in a world always or never, i.e. the relation does not depend 
on times. We can then write it in the form K(w, £, E') — in world w 
E causes E'. Our basic idea for determining this relation is: £ is a 
cause of E' if the occurrence of E is something that first guarantees 
the occurrence of E'. This idea must now be made precise in our 
frame of tree-universes. If we use the abbreviations: 
D9: (a) E° «= {w: Vr(wx e E)} - The SA that E occurs. 
(b) / ) (£ , w, 0 := WHit) c= £ ° - In w, f £ is determined. 
(c) DB(E, w) := Vx(wx G £ A Z)(£, W, T,)) - in w E is determined 
from its beginning, 
our explication takes the form: 
D10: tf(w, £ , E) KT(WT G E A A WY(H>' G WHit° A W'X G E ZD 
DB(E\ w ) A i / ) ( £ ' , w', x\))). 
It is based on the following considerations: 
(1) A cause in w is an event occurring in w. Hence there has to be an 
interval T with wT G E. 
(2) That the occurrence of E' is not guaranteed until E occurs means 
firstly that it is certain that E' will occur if E occurs. "Certain", here, 
can have an epistemic as well as a factual sense. For a person the 
occurrence of an event is doxastically certain if he is convinced that it 
will occur. Factual or objective certainty, on the other hand, is an 
alethic modality. Since we want to give a purely objective sense to 
causal statements we take certainty as timedependent necessity, refer-
ring it to the beginning of E in w, i.e. to T, . This means that we take 
the circumstances obtaining in w and T, into account. That gives us 
(*) A w'(w' e W*0 A VT'M eE) ZD Vx'\Wx. e E'% 
or * r M T , ) n E° cz E'\ 
Since Vx'\Wx. e E') follows from DB(E\ w'\ (*) is implied by the 
second conjunct of D10. It is a version of the traditional idea of a 
necessary connection between cause and effect. Since Hume has 
shown that no logical necessity is involved, today a nomological one 
is assumed, if this idea is still accepted. Our necessity is neither a logi-
cal nor a nomological one, both being independent of time. (*) just 
says: In view of the circumstances obtaining in w and T,, E' must 
occur if E does, no matter how the world goes on. If we say that E 
causes E' we mostly do not want to imply that events of the type of 
E will always be followed by events of the type of E\ much less still 
that this regularity holds as a matter of natural law. Eve's slipping on 
a banana skin was the cause of her breaking a leg, but nobody 
assumes that everyone's slip on a banana skin results in a broken leg. 
Rather it were the special circumstances that, in Eve's case, made her 
slip result in a broken leg. 
This example might suggest that for £ to be a cause of E' in w it is 
only necessary that an occurrence of E under the circumstances 
obtaining in w at T, , the beginning of E in w, results in E'. The explo-
sion of a bomb is the cause of John's death even if the bomb, if it 
had exploded later on, when John would have been somewhere else, 
would not have killed him. Therefore it might be argued that only 
worlds have to be considered, in which E also begins at T, . We have 
to distinguish, however, between the concrete event The explosion of 
the bomb' and the abstract event, that the bomb exploded. The first 
one occurs at a specific time and with John close to it. The second, on 
the other hand, can occur at a different time in a different world and 
with John far away. So the first may be the cause of John's death 
while the second is not. In our general definition, then, we do not 
want to refer only to occurrences of E that start in T, . 
(3) That the occurrence of E' was not guaranteed until E occurred 
means, secondly, that in w and T, it is not yet certain, i.e. necessary, 
that Ef occur. This is —i D(E\ w, T,), and in view of (*) it implies 
—iD(E, w, Tj), or —\DB(E, w). The intuitive idea from which we started 
was that causes are events that do not have to happen, events which are 
not determined before they begin. As events occur in the transition from 
WS to other WS we can also say, that causes are not yet determined at 
the moment of their beginning. 
D10, however, demands not only - \D(E\ w, T,) but —i/)(£", w', x\) 
for all worlds w' from WHir° and intervals x' with w'T> e E. This is 
because we want to have 
(**) K(w, E, E) A wT e E => Aw'{w' e W"ix° n E° ZD 
K(w\ E, E')) — If E causes E' in w, then it is 
necessary from the start of E in w that all possible 
occurrences of E cause E'. 
This is not a direct consequence of our general idea of causes and 
their effects, but it seems intuitively appropriate to say that it is fixed 
from the beginning of E in w that E cause E' whatever turn the 
history will take. 
(4) We interpret the idea that the effect is guaranteed to occur, given 
the cause, in the strong sense that E' is determined from its very 
beginning. That would be a consequence of (*) if we had postulated 
that the effect begins not before the end of the cause, but this is not 
implied by D10. A chance event is a typical example of an event that 
is not determined from its beginning, and it should not be an effect. 
But so far it would be in accordance with our stipulations to say: The 
event that a toss of a coin results in "heads", is the effect of the 
event, that Joe takes the coin in hand and tosses "heads" with it. To 
exclude cases like that we demand that effects be determined from 
their very beginning. That gives us DB(E\ w). Even this is a very 
strong assumption. Firstly, together with ~nDB(E9 w), it implies that 
effects are never causes. Secondly, heating a gas does not cause it — 
in the sense of D10 — to expand. To capture cases like that we have 
to introduce piecemeal causation in the sense of David Lewis: E 
causes E' piecemeal if there are temporal parts £"„ of E 
and of E' such that Et causes E- in the sense of D10 
(1 ^ 1 < n). Piecemeal causation has to be used anyway for an 
analysis of cases of self-causation2 with an asymmetrical causal 
relation, but we have to refer to it even in situations where other 
theories get along without it. 
If our concept of causation is to satisfy condition (**), we again 
have to strengthen the postulate DB(E\ w) to DB(E\ w') as in D10. 
From DB(E\ w') and ~iD(E\ w\ x\) we obtain x\ ^ i", SO that E' 
starts later than E in all the worlds from W"ix°. This is not very 
problematic. Examples of alleged effects that precede their causes are 
not very convincing,3 and physics, at least, assumes that effects are 
propagated with finite velocities. It is not a consequence of D10, how-
ever, that the effect does not start before the cause is completed. Since 
we have to use piecemeal causation anyway even this would not be 
unacceptable, and we might replace condition DB(E', w') by the 
stronger x2 ^ x\. Then we could not say that the egg I have for 
breakfast is hard because it was boiled for 15 minutes, since it was 
already hard after 10 minutes, but we might also say that only the 
10-minutes cooking was the cause of the egg's being hard. Since our 
definition yields a rather exclusive concept of causation as it is, we do 
not want to draw its boundaries still closer, however. Neither do we 
demand that the effect is not determined earlier than the cause — that 
it is not determined later is a consequence of (*). Cases of causal 
overdetermination are to be admitted, but in them another cause, and 
thereby the common effect, may be determined before E. 
All this shows that there is a certain latitude in explicating the basic 
notion of causation, from which we started. We might, furthermore, 
refer the necessary connection of cause and effect not to the beginning 
of the cause, but to its point of determination, i.e. the last time when 
it was still possible that the cause would not occur. And we could 
add to D10 the condition that the occurrence of E' is not a logical 
consequence of the occurrence of E. Even if it is not implied by 
E° a E'° that E, if it occurs, is a cause of at least the event 
that E' is going to occur should not be a cause of E'. Let E' be an 
event that does not start in any world at / = 0, that is not deter-
mined in w, 0, but is determined from its beginning in all the worlds 
from W"*® where it occurs. Then F*(E') {wT: T, = 0 A Vx'(wt. e 
E' A x2 = x\ — 1)} is the event that E' will begin, and it is a cause 
of E' according to D10. But as this is easily remedied and we are only 
after a simple model for our intuitive notion of causation that yields 
a first basis for discussing it, we shall leave such modifications aside, 
here. 
Our relation of causing is asymmetrical, as any respectable causal 
relation should be; effects are determined from their beginning while 
causes are not. Therefore the relation is transitive only in trivial sense: 
effects are never causes. 
If Ew is the concrete event £ , as it is realized in w (under certain 
aspects), Ew is a proper subset of E. Now K(w, E, E') implies K(w, 
£M, E'), but neither does the converse hold nor the implication from 
K(w, E, E') to K(w, E, E^,) or vice versa. On the object level this 
raises no difficulties as the sets E and EH. are patently different. On the 
level of normal language, however, one has to be careful since there 
the difference between sentences "The fact that A causes the fact that 
B" and those of the form "Event e causes event e"\ where ' V and 
4 V " are names of events, is not always clearly marked. A name for 
an event signifies this event as it happens in the world from which 
the causal relation is considered. If A and B express eventlike SAs 
corresponding to the events E and Ef and if "e" and "e"' are 
normalization of A and B, then the two sentences are related as 
K(w, E, E') to K(w, Ew, E».). In the example we used above: The fact 
that the bomb exploded, is not the cause of the fact that John died 
afterwards, even though the explosion of the bomb was the cause of 
his death. If it was necessary from the start that the bomb should 
explode sooner or later, the fact that it exploded, is not even a 
possible cause, but the explosion of the bomb is, if it was not certain 
from the start that it should explode exactly when it actually did. 
V. D I S C U S S I O N 
In this section some objections against our concept of causation will 
be considered. The main objection, of course, is that for many people 
the succession of events in deterministic worlds is the paradigm for 
causal connections, while in such worlds there are no causes at all in 
our sense. Now the real world, as far as we know, is indeterministic. 
Aside from physical theories our normal conceptions of human action 
and responsibility preclude a deterministic view, too. Whether true or 
not, for their reconstruction at least we have to assume indeterministic 
worlds. So there is no lack of applications for our notion. On the 
other hand we cannot claim that it covers all the intuitions that 
govern our talk of causes in everyday life and in science. We already 
remarked that doxastic aspects may play a role. As cause often an 
event is pointed out, the occurrence of which was unknown or 
unusual, and which makes it more plausible that the effect came 
about. This idea is taken up in the probability theory of causation, if 
- following Hume - one thinks of subjective probabilities. The cen-
tral idea of regularity theories of causation to take effects as nomolo-
gical consequences of their causes is also justified intuitively. We say, 
for instance, that it was the fact that the temperature sank below the 
freezing point that caused the water pipe's bursting. This would not 
be a cause in our sense since the sinking of the temperature was the 
effect of preceding meteorological events. Objections against theories 
of causation often wrongly presuppose that there is just one single 
type of causation, and the theories, in turn, invite such objections by 
sharing this presupposition and claiming this one and only type to be 
that which they define. But even if it be granted that our definition is 
only concerned with one type of causation, that does not save it from 
all objections, of course. The notion might, after all, be incoherent 
or yield contra-intuitive results even in the restricted range of its 
applicability. 
(1) No causal chains 
Since effects are not causes there are no causal chains. But then it 
seems problematic to admit long intervals between the end of the 
cause and the beginning of the effect, as we have done in D10. Causa-
tion at a temporal distance is only conceivable, one might say, as 
mediate causation through causal chains in which every cause is 
contiguous with its direct effect. Without contiguity the cause alone 
cannot explain the effect. First, too much may happen in-between. 
Second, there must be a reason why the effect begins exactly at the 
time it does and neither earlier nor later. Since the cause is already 
completed it cannot explain this. Now, the first doubt is eliminated by 
postulating a necessary connexion between cause and effect; as long 
as something can still happen that would preempt the efficacy of the 
cause there is no necessary connection. The second doubt is more 
serious. If E is the cause of E', E is not thereby also the cause of E's 
occurring at a certain time — that would be a more specific event 
than E'. There may be reasons, however, that are not causes, for a 
later beginning of the effect. According to some natural law the effect 
may take a certain time — calculable from the law — to materialize 
after the cause is completed. I bump against a flower pot on my 
window sill. Some time after the bump, depending on the height, it 
will crash on the ground. The assumption of a mediating chain of 
contiguous causes and effects seems no less artificial than Aristotle's 
assumption of the air pushing the stone I have thrown to account for 
its moving on after it has left my hand. 
(2) Necessary causes 
We cannot read K(w\ E, E) as "In w E is the cause of £"' . Both 
K(w, E') and K(w, E2, E') may be true without £, and E2 being 
identical. The two causes may not only be logically but factually in-
dependent. There would be a logical dependence for £, <z E2 or 
E2 c £ , , and a factual dependence if in the beginning of £, it would 
be necessary for E2 to happen if £, occurs, or vice versa. There must 
be an overlap between £, and E2 in vv, however, since E' is deter-
mined after one of the causes is completed. Causes, according to D10, 
then, are sufficient, but not necessary conditions for the effect. It is 
possible (in the beginning of a cause) that the effect occurs without 
the cause. 
In the literature "necessary causes" play an important role, as 
events without which the effect would not have taken place. Paresis, 
to use a well-worn example, only occurs after an infection with syph-
illis, but even then only in about 5% of the cases. Nevertheless, we 
say that paresis is caused by an infection with syphillis. Since here the 
infection is not sufficient but only necessary for paresis to occur, it is 
no cause in our sense. But we certainly do not call every necessary 
condition of an event its "cause" either, otherwise we should have to 
say that a cause of Joe's motor accident was that he left his house in 
the morning. The difference between the two examples seems to be 
that in the first case nothing extraordinary has to happen between the 
infection and the development of paresis. The unusual thing is the 
infection, not the consequence, given the infection. In the second case, 
however, Joe's leaving his house in the morning is not the remarkable 
thing but, let us say, someone overlooking a red light. The same thing 
holds in another standard example: I give Mary a box of poisoned 
chocolates. She eats one and dies. Here, too, my action is not suffi-
cient for her death - after all she might have not have eaten from 
the chocolates - it is just necessary for it. Still we say that my action 
was the cause of her death since what she did was only to be expected. 
Causes, it seems, are always sufficient for the effect, but often they are 
sufficient in a weak epistemic sense only; they make the occurrence of 
the effect more probable.4 "Normal" and "usual" are typical doxastic 
concepts, for what we take to be normal under given circumstances is 
what we have come to expect. Since we are interested in a purely 
objective concept of causation such "necessary causes" are beyond 
our scope. 
(3) Causal preemption 
John jumps out of a window on the 12th floor of a building ( £ ) , 
which is surrounded by concrete so that it is certain that he will be 
dead after hitting the ground (£') . But while he flies past the 8th floor 
he is shot from a window (£"), so that he is in fact already dead 
before he reaches the ground. Here we should say that the cause of 
John's death was not E but E". But since we have assumed that with 
E the occurrence of E' is already guaranteed, we should have to say 
that £ , and not was the cause of £". Now, evidently, it makes a 
difference whether we speak of the concrete event of John's death or 
of E\ i.e. the fact that John is dead after hitting the ground. John's 
death occurs earlier and is a death by shooting, and its cause, there-
fore, is not E but £"'. David Lewis has objected against too concrete 
("fragile") descriptions of events as a way out of such problems,5 but 
where we have to look for a cause doubtlessly depends on the effect, 
and in our case there are clearly two different effects. E is the cause 
of E\ and the shot from the 8th floor window made no difference 
to this effect. But E" is the cause of John's death, and this, as it 
actually occurred, was not guaranteed by E. The man who shot John, 
therefore, will be indicted for murder, but he cannot be held respon-
sible for the consequences of E' for they would have come about 
anyhow. 
(4) The principle of causality 
Not every event has a cause — none that is not determined from its 
very beginning has. Now according to D10 the principle of causality 
is not only violated in indeterministic worlds — that wouldn't be so 
unusual — but also in deterministic ones. In them there is no cause 
at all. This, however, is not a real objection since our concept of 
causation was designed for indeterministic worlds. The failure of the 
causal principle, furthermore, does not imply that there are events 
that cannot be explained — there are, after all, reasons that are not 
causes. 
The problem of a common cause makes trouble for regularity theories. 
It does not arise for our conception, for the effect of a cause can 
never be the cause of something, and therefore not the cause of 
another, later effect of its own cause. There remains the distinction 
between causes and necessary circumstances. For regularity-theories 
this is also a very real problem.6 A short-circuit in a defective cable is 
the cause of a fire. But it could only have this effect as there was 
enough oxygen. Why is the short-circuit but not the presence of the 
oxygen the cause of the fire? The oxygen is a necessary circumstance 
in the sense that if there had been no oxygen the short-circuit would 
not have caused the fire. Can we then in our framework state truth 
conditions for such counterfactuals? This is important for completing 
our theory of causation, since every useful theory must be able to 
distinguish causes from necessary circumstances. 
V I . A L T E R N A T I V E S A N D S T R A T E G I E S 
First, however, we shall point out connexions between our concept of 
causing and that of an agent bringing something about. In this sec-
tion we shall supply the conceptual instruments for defining actions. 
Its content is a shortened version of (1986).7 
We now conceive of the transition from one WS i to a succeeding 
WS j as due to the action of agents. In i every agent s has a set 
A(s, i) of alternatives open to him, and the choice of one of his alter-
natives by each agent determines the actual successor state of /. Let 
D l l : W{ := {j: irj) — the set of immediate successors of /. 
Then A(s, i) is a partition of i.e. a set of disjunct subsets of Wt, 
whose union is Wx. A(s, i) = {Wt} is admitted. In this case the agent 
s has no real alternatives. This makes it possible for us to assume the 
same set of agents for every WS, even if only a few of them have a 
real choice in each of them. For the sake of simplicity we will assume 
the set of agents S = {sx, . . . , s„} to be finite. Our talk of "agents" 
and "choices" has to be taken in a very broad sense, though. Mother 
Nature is an agent, too, and her "actions" consist in chance events. 
The "actions" we talk about, then, are not all of them actions in the 
usual sense of the word. 
Let us call tree-universes for which alternatives are defined, TA-
universes. 
D12: A TA-universe is a quadruple U21 = </, r, 5, A} such that 
(1) </, r> is a tree-universe. 
(2) 5 = {J,, . . . , s„} is a non-empty set of agents. 
(3) For all s G S and / e I: 
(a) X, Y G A(s, i) A I ^ Y ^ X n Y = A 
(b) [)A(s, i) = W, 
(c) Xx e A(S]J) A . . . A Xn G A(sn, i) 3 Vj(Xx n . . . n Xn = {j}). 
Conditions (a) and (b) say that A(s, i) is a partition of Wt; — X e A(s, 
i) 3 X # A follows from (c). (c) states that the actions of all the 
agents together uniquely determine one successor of /. This implies 
that every agent can execute each of his alternatives, no matter what 
the other agents are doing. The alternatives of the group {skl, ...,%} 
of agents (kq e {1, . . . , « } , q e {1, . . . , r}) then is: 
D13: A({skl, . . . , j*r}, /) := {Xx n . . . n Xr\ X] G A(sk], i) A . . . A 
Xr G A(skr, i)}. 
This yields A(S, i) = {{j}: irj}. 
An (infinite) strategy of s in i is defined by the choice of an alter-
native Xt e A(s, /), the choice of an alternative Xj for all j e Xi9 the 
choice of an alternative Xk for each k e A} and all such Xj9 and so on. 
It is a segment IT of the tree U, beginning with i and defined by a 
relation r' for which {k: jr'k] e A(s9j). A strategy in the wider sense is 
a segment IT of U, beginning with / and defined by a relation r' such 
that for all j in the domain of r' there are alternatives Xx, . . . , Xr 
from ^(5, j) with yr'A:} = Xx u . . . u Xr. So it does not commit s 
to just one alternative in every WS j but leaves it open for some or all 
j\ what alternative s choses from a subset of A(s,j). A strategy is 
finite if in every branch of IT there is a WS k after which r' coincides 
with r, i.e. if it guides s only up to k. In what follows the word 
"strategy" is always understood in the sense of finite strategies in the 
wider sense. 
We can also represent strategies as sets of worlds. If a strategy 
corresponds to the segment IT of U it is then taken as the set of 
worlds of U belonging to If. Let 
D14: f(s9 w, /) ••= {w'\ w'(t + l ) e iX(Xe A(s9 w(t)) A w(t + 1 ) 6 X)}. 
f(s, w, i) is the set of worlds going through the WSs of that alter-
native X of s in w(/), to which w(t + 1) belongs. We have then f(S\ 
w , 0 = C)sesf(si f) for all groups 5' of agents, and /(S, w, /) = 
WHit+l). If £/, U\ . . . are sets of worlds we can define the set R(s, i) 
of strategies of s in i as 
D15: R(s, i) := {U: A / [/ c I f 1 A A WW7(W e t/ A Z(I) ^ r A 
HR' 6 / ( 5 , W, 0 3 VW\W € U A W"(' + 1) = W'(^ + 1))) A A W(W € 
U ZD Vt(z(i) < / A WHil) cz U)) A A w(A/(z(/) ^ / A VW(W e 
JJ A W'{t) = W(0) D W 6 t/)}. 
The last condition is to ensure that there are no more sets in R(s9 /), 
than subtrees U. It could be dispensed with, if, instead of finite 
strategies we considered only bounded ones as such U e R(s, i) for 
which Vt A w(w e U ZD W*V) CZ U) holds. W{ is a strategy of s in 1, 
too, one that does not commit s to anything. We call it the empty 
strategy. If U is a non-empty strategy of s in / there is another 
strategy U' of s in 1 with U - U' - U.ln this sense the agent 
can omit doing what he does in U. He can do something else which 
may have different effects. This does not imply, however, that he can 
do something that excludes any course of events compatible with his 
doing what he does in U. In the latter sense we might speak of refrain-
ing. The non-empty strategies in R(s, i) are then possible courses of 
action for the agent s in /, which he may omit, but not all of them are 
such that he can refrain from them. 
The non-empty strategy U of s in / uniquely corresponds to the 
event E(U) := {wx: w e U A T, = z(i) A A*(T 2 < t = Wm a U)}. 
Let R*(s, i) be the set of non-empty strategies of s in /, represented as 
events. Strategies for groups of agents are to be defined correspon-
dingly. Then we have: 
(*) EGR*(S, w(t)) = A * E A AW'T(W>; G E ZD 
W' G WHit) A T, = / A - ! / ) ( £ , W', T 2 - 1)) A 
A w ( A / ( z ( / ) ^ / 3 Vw'(w' G E° A w'(0 = 
w(0) w G £°). 
VII. C A U S I N G A N D B R I N G I N G A B O U T 
If an agent realizes a non-empty strategy, that is an action of s — 
again only in a very broad sense of this word, s brings it about, that 
an event E' occurs, if s does something, which causes E ' . If we write 
A(s, w, E) for "In w the event E is an action of and B(w, s, E') for 
"In w s brings it about that we obtain the definitions: 
D16: (a) A(w, 5, E) := KT(WT GE A EG R*(S, W(T,))) 
(b) £(H>, J, £") .= j , A K(w, £, £')). 
The first one is alright because every agent can omit doing each of his 
actions as we have seen — an action is something the agent could 
have left undone. The second definition is acceptable since from E G 
R*(s, w(0) we obtain A w'(w' G WHIT) 3 —\DB(E, w')) - R*(s, w(t)) 
does not contain the empty strategy. Therefore the actions from 
R*(s, w(t)) are possible causes in the sense of D10, they are not deter-
mined from their beginning.8 
If S' cz S is a set of agents, the relations A(w, S\ E) and B(w, S\ 
E') can be defined correspondingly. For S' c S" <= S we have 
R*(S', i) cz R*(S", i) and therefore A(w, S\ E) ZD A(W, S", E). This 
looks worse than it actually is, for if we have E e R*(S\ i) and E e 
R*(S", i) the agents that are relevant for determining the strategy E 
are the same in both cases. We say that an agent s in S' is relevant 
for E, if E s R*(S' - {*}, /) does not hold. For E e R*(s, i) and 
E G R*(s\ i) we always have s = s\ The relations 2?(w, S\ E') and 
B(w, S", £")> however, may hold even for different sets of relevant 
agents. But this is as it should be, since we have not excluded causal 
overdetermination in the definition D10 of causation. 
D16 immediately yields: 
(1) If s brings it about that E' occurs, there is an action E of s that 
causes E'. Bringing about it a causing by actions. But we also have 
(2) Every cause of E' contains an action of agents by which they 
bring Ef about. 
Assuming K(w, £, E') and wT G E, let be the event {wT<: T| = 
t, A D(E, w, T j ) A —\D(E, w, T2 — 1)}, i.e. the event that E happens 
in w and comes to its point of determination. Then £, G R*(S, W(T,)). 
This follows directly from (*) at the end of the preceding section, for 
—1 D(EX, H>, tj) is a consequence of —\D(E, w, T,), which follows from 
D10. If there is a time / in which all occurrences of E that start in 
W(T,) have come to their point of determination, which is the normal 
case, we may also choose the less exclusive event {w^ : Vw'x"(w'x. G 
E A w' G W*tl) A x\ = T, = x'[ A Z)(£, w\ t j) A ~ i Z ) ( £ , w\ x\ - 1))} 
instead of £ , , i.e. the event that E starts in W(T,) and comes to its 
point of determination. From K(w, £, E') we then obtain K(w, £,, £"). 
That is: E causes E' iff there is a set of agents who, by doing what 
they do in the course of E, bring it about that E' occurs. Thus our 
causal relation has an "actionistic" character — if only in a very 
wide, formal sense, since we also count chance events as "actions" of 
Nature. This character is already indicated by the basic idea of D10, 
according to which causes are events that need not have happened 
together with our interpretation of branching as a matter of choice.9 
VIII. C O N D I T I O N A L S 
Let us turn back to the question raised at the end of Section V how 
conditionals can be interpreted given tree-universes. Our aim is to 
state truth conditions for a unified type of if-then-sentence which can 
be read as an indicative conditional or as a counterfactual according 
to the possibility or impossibility of the if-part. We write C(w, /, X9 Y) 
for "In w and /: If it is the case that X, then it is the case that Y". 
X, Y, . . . are to be SAs, i.e. subsets of W x T. Conditional relations 
do not hold only between events but also between types of events, 
that may occur several times in the same world, between states or 
eternal SAs. 1 0 The truth value of conditionals depends not only on 
worlds but also on the time of their utterance. The sentence "If it will 
rain, John will stay at home" may be true today but false tomorrow 
when other circumstances obtain. 
An indicative conditional "If X then y" is usually uttered only if it 
is both possible that X holds and that X does not hold. "Possible" 
can be understood in the sense of an alethic or of a doxastic modal-
ity; X may be contingent or it may be unknown whether X holds. 
Ignoring epistemic matters the normal condition for indicative con-
ditionals is WHil) n Xt ^ A ^ W*l) n Xt.ln this case we say that 
C(w, u X, Y) holds iff n Xt cz Yn i.e. iff N(w, /, X u Y). So 
"If X, then Y" is true iff Y holds in all the actually possible worlds in 
which X holds. As a rule, also, we only say "If X then y" in cases 
where it is uncertain whether Y holds, i.e. for WHit) n Yt # A ^ 
WHit) n ?,". But if Y is certainly not the case, i.e. for Wm cz Yt 
the statement "If X then y" is wrong. And if Y is certain, i.e. for 
W*<t) _ yn w e should only say something like "y, even if X", and 
this will then be true for all X satisfying the normal condition. The 
result is: 
(a) W+* n Xt ± A * n Xt ZD (C(W, t, X9 Y) = 
nXt cz Yt). 
A counterfactual "If X were the case, then Y would be the case" is 
uttered only when it is certain that X is not the case. This, again, can 
be taken epistemically or alethically. In the latter case the normal 
condition is WH<0 cz Xt. We distinguish two cases: If it has never been 
possible in w that X would hold in r, i.e. for IV*0) cz Xt C(H>, /, X, Y) 
is to be true. This is a borderline case so that we are in no danger to 
offend any intuitions. If, on the other hand, Xt has been possible at some 
time in H>, C(W, f, X, Y) is to hold if in the latest among these 
times, the sentence "If X will hold in /, then Y will also hold in t" 
was true under normal conditions for indicative conditionals, i.e. for 
WHin n Xt cz Yt. It is sufficient to demand that there is such a time 
t\ however, for if /' < f and lVHin n X, cz Yt we also have WHi° n 
Xt cz Y( because of WHin cz WHin; t' ^ / holds in view of Wm n 
Xt = A . WHit) cz X( implies W*in n Xt * A for all /' < /. The idea, 
then, is this: Evaluating a counterfactual "If X were the case, then Y 
would be the case" we have to go back to a situation, i.e. a time, 
when it was still possible that X would hold in /. This situation 
should be as similar to the present one as possible, and therefore 
should be the last point /' in which it was possible that X should hold 
in /. If in this moment we can say "If X will hold in t, then Y will 
hold in t" the counterfactual is true, otherwise false. 
Now we normally say "If X were the case, then Y would be the 
case" only if it is also certain, that Y does not obtain, i.e. for Wm cz 
Yt. For W"v) cz Yt we should rather say "Even if it would be the case 
that X, it would still be the case that K". But this case, as well as the 
one in which Y is uncertain in /, can be treated in the same way as 
the normal one. So we get: 
(b) WHil) c Xt ZD (C(w, r, X, Y) = W*i0) cz Xt v 
/ A A * Ww(n n Xt cz Yt)). 
If it is certain that X obtains we neither say "If X is the case, . . . " 
nor "If X were the case, . . . ". Therefore we can complete our stipu-
lations any way we like, for instance like this: 
(c) WHil) cz Xt ZD (C(w, /, X9 Y) = WHit) cz Yt). 
This would be unacceptable if we wanted to read C(w, /, X, Y) as 
" Y because X" if the premis of (c) holds, but we have no ambition to 
include such sentences in our analysis. 
Together (a) to (c) yield the definition: 
D17: C(w, /, X, Y) := W*iQ) cz Xt v Vt\t' < t A A # WHin n 
X, cz Y,). 
F(X) := {<H>, />: Vt\t </' A O , /'> 6 X)} is the SA that X will be 
the case, P(X) := {<w, />: Vt\t' < t A <W, / '> € JIT)} the SA that X 
was the case. With these operations we can also formulate condition-
als like "If X will be the case, then Y will be the case", "If X was the 
case, Y will be the case", etc. 
Mostly conditionals are interpreted by similarity relations between 
worlds.11 The logic of conditionals resulting from D17 is the standard one 
(Lewis', not Stalnaker's) if only weakly centered comparative similarity 
systems are used, i.e. relations W ^w W (w' is at most as similar to w as 
w" is), for which we have not w ^w W ZD W' = w, but only W ^ww. This 
difference is important: Strongly centered systems make "If A, then B" 
true in case "A" and " £ " are both true, and such a principle is not 
acceptable for indicative conditionals. In our framework we can define 
weakly centered systems as follows: Let Sw = W"i0) and for all w\ w" e 
Sw: W <H,, W iff At'(t' ^  t A W e WHin z> W e WHin). A world W 
from Sw9 then, as seen from /, is more "similar" to w than W if it 
shares a longer common history with w in the interval [0, t] than w' 
does. We assume that / is not the last of all times, so that f + 1 is in 
T. Otherwise the relation would coincide with A t(w' e WMt) => W e 
Wm), and that yields a strongly centered system. Finally we stipulate: 
If H'R is not in SH., vvr < K W holds for all W, and if w", but not W is in 
SH then W <wt W. The relations <w></ are transitive and connex. They 
only have the formal properties of similarities; intuitively worlds diverg-
ing earlier may be more similar if they differ only in minor aspects. 
If C(A9 B) is the equivalent of "If A, then B" in the language of 
conditional logic the standard truth condition for it is: 
(*) VW(C(A, B)) = / iff Sw cz [~iA] v VW{W e [A] n 
Sw A A w"(w' <H,, W A W e [A] z> W e [B])). 
Here V is the interpretation function and [A] is the set of /4-worlds, 
i.e. the set {w: VW(A) = t}. This corresponds to D17 if we turn to 
interpretation functions VWJ - the truth-conditions in (*) depend on / 
- and consider only eternal SAs as arguments of C(w, /, X9 Y). X is 
an eternal SA if there is a set U of worlds with X = U x T. If U and 
U' are sets of worlds D17 says C(w, /, U, U') = Sw cz U v Vt\t' < 
/ A A / WHin n U cz U'\ For U = [A] and £/' = [5] this is 
equivalent to (*).12 
While the notion of an overall similarity between worlds remains 
extremely vague in the usual treatments it receives a more precise 
sense in our definition by reference to tree-universes. Our intuitions 
about the branching of worlds in a model supposed to represent a 
part of reality are, of course, not any clearer than those concerning 
the validity of conditionals about this part of the world. As we 
determine the set of possible worlds referred to in an interpretation 
of a fragment of natural language with a view to what sentences we 
take to be analytically true or analytically false, we have to determine 
the branchings of the world with reference to the conditionals we 
take to be true. We have to ask: What will be the case, or what is 
actually possible given this and that, and what would be the case 
or have been possible if this or that would have happened. Neverthe-
less the statement, that a sentence is analytically true if it is true 
in all possible worlds, is not useless for our understanding of the 
notion 'analytical truth'. And the same holds for the interpretation of 
conditionals by D17. It is not the task of logic to say which con-
ditionals are actually true. But the utility of tree-universes does also 
not consist merely in defining a logic for conditionals. They rather 
allow us to study conditional dependences in simple models, and in 
this they are more useful than a reference to unspecified similarity 
relations. 
As conditionals are only a side-issue in this paper I shall not 
discuss the intuitive correctness of D17. It should be emphasized, 
however, that the use of the indicative or subjunctive mood depends 
on our assumptions about the facts. We say "If Oswald didn't shoot 
Kennedy, then someone else did", if we are not sure about Oswald 
being responsible, although now it is either necessary that he did it or 
necessary that he did not do it, so that our objective normal con-
dition for indicative conditionals is not satisfied. The use of the indi-
cative presupposes the subjective uncertainty of the antecedent con-
dition and the acceptability of our conditional depends upon the 
further assumption that Kennedy has indeed been shot. The counter-
factual "If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, then someone else would 
have", on the other hand, presupposes that Oswald did the shooting. 
This presupposition is connected with our conviction that Kennedy 
has been shot, and therefore this conviction will be suspended on the 
counterfactual assumption. This explains why we do not accept the 
counterfactual. This example does not, then, show that indicatives 
and counterfactuals have different truth conditions. All it shows is 
that they have different presuppositions that may result in different 
epistemic attitudes towards them. 
IX. C A U S E S A N D N E C E S S A R Y C I R C U M S T A N C E S 
A workable theory of causation should be able to distinguish causes 
from necessary circumstances, we said at the end of Section V. In our 
example of a short-circuit causing a fire the presence of oxygen was 
such a necessary condition. Let us take circumstances to be events 
here. This is no strong restriction of generality, for the continuance of 
a state in an interval, its beginning or ending are events, too. We 
mostly talk about necessary circumstances at a time when the cause is 
already completed and it is certain that the effect thas occurred or will 
occur. Then every necessary condition for its occurrence is sure to be 
fulfilled. But if the effect's occurrence, is necessary in /, and F is 
any event, for which F* is also necessary in /, the statement that F 
occurs if E' does, is true. Therefore this conditional is not an appro-
priate expression of a necessary condition. We rather have to use the 
counterfactual "If F would not occur, E' would not occur either". We 
say, then, that^as seen from w and /, is a necessary condition for E' 
iff C(w, /, F°, 
Necessary conditions, however, are not always necessary circum-
stances. E', for instance, is a necessary condition for E' itself, and a 
cause of E' can also be a necessry condition for E'. A necessary cir-
cumstance is an event that is already completed, or at least deter-
mined, when E' begins. It is a precondition for E\ i.e. a necessary 
condition for which there is a time /' such that D(F, w, t') A 
~n D(E\ w, /'). This excludes the two unwanted cases, for if £ is a 
cause of £", E' is determined when E is. 
The presence of oxygen is a precondition for the fire, since a fire 
can only develop if there is oxygen. Let us assume now that the short-
circuit has occurred in a defective part of a cable. Then it is also a 
necessary circumstance for its causing the fire that some inflammable 
material was close to this part of the cable. Let this be the event F. 
F is no precondition for the fire, since the fire could also have arisen 
at another place in the building, by arson, e.g. A necessary circum-
stance for the causation of one event by another, then, is not always a 
precondition for the effect, but rather a necessary condition for the 
first event's causing the second. To exclude unwanted cases we again 
have to postulate that the circumstance be determined before the 
effect. If we write NC(w, /, F, F, E') for "As seen from w and t F is 
a necessary circumstance for F's causing F \ " we then obtain the 
definition: 
D18: NC(w, /, F, F, F') := C(w<, /, F°, {w: - I * ( H \ F, £ ' )}) A 
w, O A - i / > ( £ ' , w, /')). 
Every precondition for F ' is also a necessary condition for F ' being 
the effect of some cause, but the inverse does not hold. 
This definition has to be tested on further examples, but the main 
thing was to show that our framework is rich enough to define truth 
conditions even for so complex sentences as "If F would not have 
occurred, F would not have caused F " \ 
N O T E S 
1 Strictly speaking, X, is not a SA according to our terminology, but sets V of worlds 
correspond to the eternal SAs U x 7*, i.e. to SAs that hold always or never in each 
world. 
2 For an example of self-causation, cf. Lewis (1986), pp. 172 sq. 
3 For physical examples cf. Hesse (1961), pp. 279 sq. The standard argument for 
admitting backward causation is the possibility of foreseeing future events: Since our 
visual experience is caused by the events we witness, foreseeing would be a case of 
backward causation. This argument is a petitio principii, however, for if seeing is a 
causal process, foreseeing can only be a sort of seeing, if there is backward causation. 
Otherwise we have to conceive of it as a kind of precognition. My present knowledge 
that the sun will rise tomorrow is not causally dependent on tomorrow's sunrise — 
though dependent on it, since I cannot know what will not happen — and the same 
thing holds for precognitions. 
4 In view of Simpson's paradox this holds only for appropriate probabilities. 
5 Cf. his postscript to "Causation" in (1986), pp. 196 sq. 
6 According to regularity theories a SA A is a cause of £ , if A and B are true and 
there is a non-empty set L of laws and a set C of singular conditions such that B is 
implied by L, C, A, but not by L, C or C, A alone. Now if B does not follow from L, 
A and C minus one of its elements, C , , then C, is also a cause of B relative to L and C 
with A substituted for C , . 
7 Nuel Belnap has developed very closely related ideas independently in two papers 
from 1989. 
8 D16(b) does not correspond exactly to the definitions given in my (1986). - If we 
want to talk about modes of actions which can be realized by the same agent at dif-
ferent times and by different agents at the same time, we first have to introduce types of 
events. The occurrences of a type T of events are events, and different occurrences of T 
in the same world have to be distinct. If we want to think of T as a set of world 
segments an equivalence relation has to be defined on T such that the equivalence 
classes [wT]T are events and wT, wz e T implies: T = T' or there is at least one point / 
between T and x. F{s) is a mode of action of agent s if it is a type of events for which 
WTJFJJ) ^ R*(s-> w ( T | ) ) ) holds. Then we can take a mode of action to 
be a function F such that F{s) is a mode of action of s for all s. s does F in w, if wT e 
F(s). — An agent can do F by doing something more specific, s does F in wx by doing 
F' if u\ e F(s) and there is an interval x' with vvt e F'(s) and [wt.]ru) o <=[wz]F(3) o. 
(tH'fW) ° i s a strategy out of R(s, W(T\)).). A. Goldman first pointed out the impor-
tance of such ^-constructions for action theory in (1971). 
9 The term "actionistic" was coined by G. H. von Wright. His analysis of causation 
in (1974) is different from mine even though there are parallels - he, too, uses tree-
universes and time dependent alethic modalities. He first defines causal laws, essentially 
as statements to the effect that every event of a type T, is immediately followed by an 
event of type r 2 , and that this has always been necessary. Singular causal statements 
are instances of such causal laws. I, on the other hand, have not demanded that they be 
subsumable under a causal law. As we have seen in Sect. IV, the effects of an event 
depend on circumstances obtaining when it occurred. With v. Wright the actionistic 
idea comes into play only in his condition for the testability of causal laws. He does 
not introduce agents and their alternatives but distinguishes one successor state for 
each WS as the normal one, the one which will result if all the agents refrain from 
interfering with the course of nature. The word "agent" is to be understood in the 
normal, narrower sense here. In our terminology this means: Nature never has a real 
alternative, and an alternative X of s in /' is a genuine action only if the normal state of 
Wt is not in X. Every agent who has a real alternative in /', then, also has the alternative 
to do nothing, not to interfere with nature. The introduction of normal states (if there 
are more than one, only one of them would be in each alternative of Nature, and the 
other agents would have one alternative in which all the normal states are included) is 
useful in a theory of action for a distinction between doing something and letting some-
thing happen. The condition of testability for the causal law that T} -events are neces-
sarily followed by ^-events, says that there has to be a possible occurrence of Tx which 
normally would not come about but can be brought about by the intervention of 
agents. If they bring it about they can test whether this Tx -event, too, is followed by a 
T2 -event, or whether the regularity just holds for the normal course of events. There is, 
in v. Wright's (1974), no statement to the effect that every instance of causation is also 
an instance of something brought about by agents. This, however, would not hold for 
us either, if we had only talked about genuine agents and genuine actions. As Max 
Urchs pointed out to me, St. Jaskowski has defined causation in (1951) in a similar way 
as I have done. Jaskowski, in turn, refers to R. Ingarden for the basic idea. 
1 0 As in (1986) states can be defined as sets of WS. If Z is a subset of / it corresponds 
to the SA {<w, />: w(t) e Z ) . 
1 1 Cf. Lewis (1973). 
1 2 We can also use selection functions instead of similarity relations. If / ( H \ t, X) is 
X, n Sw n (){WHin: /' ^  t A WHi,) n Xt ± A} we have/(n-, r, X) c Yt = 
C ( H \ /, X, Y).f satisfies the usual conditions: f(w\ /, X) c Xt n Sw, Xt a Yt A 
f{w, /, X) # A 3/(w, /, Y) * A , / ( H - , t,X)nYt* A =>/(w, /, X n Y) = 
/ (u\ t,X)n Yt and w G / ( H \ f, X x T) = WMt). We also have: w' G / (W\ f, W x T) => 
/(vv, /, X) = f(w\ t, X) and (J/(H\ X) = SH.. Because of w' e W*i0) => W** = 
Ww{0) the concept W + ( H \ /, X) := C(w, /, ^ , X) = SH cz Xt has the properties of an 
S5-necessity. These additional principles supply truth-conditions for sentences with 
iterated applications of the conditional operator. They correspond to those proposed 
in Kutschera (1976), 3.2 and 3.3. - As far as I see, the closest relative to the inter-
pretation of conditionals proposed here is that given by Richmond Thomason and Anil 
Gupta in (1981). They, too, use tree-universes and have a Principle of Past Predomi-
nance according to which worlds are more similar if they share a longer common 
history. Antecedent similarity has also been emphasized by Frank Jackson, Brian Ellis, 
David Lewis and Wayne Davis. In "Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow" 
(1979, repr. in (1986), pp. 32 sq.) Lewis gives an "Analysis 1" of counterfactuals 
(p. 39), which is very closely related to ours. His reasons for discarding it are: (1) It 
does not work for antecedents like "If kangaroos had no tails . . . " that do not refer 
to any specific time. (2) It makes the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence between 
future and past an analytical truth. The first objection cannot be raised against our 
definition, however, and to me the dependence of the present on the past but not on 
the future is not an empirical matter. What Lewis says in this paper about assessing 
similarities and how smaller or greater miracles subtract from them seems to have just 
one clear consequence: we may choose as standards of similarity whatever fits the 
intended result, and this means just that similarities are no help whatever for their 
evaluation. Counterfactuals may be vague, but surely they are far from being as vague 
as the notion of similarity of worlds. 
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